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0ABSTRACT
We oﬀer a rationale for the decision to extend the franchise to women within a politico-economic
model where men are richer than women, women display a higher preference for public goods,
and women’s disenfranchisement carries a societal cost. We ﬁrst derive the tax rate chosen by the
male median voter when women are disenfranchised. Next we show that, as industrialization raises
the reward to mental labor relative to physical labor, women’s relative wage increases. When the
cost of disenfranchisement becomes higher than the cost of the higher tax rate which applies under
universal enfranchisement, the male median voter is better oﬀ extending the franchise to women. A
consequent expansion of the size of government is only to be expected in societies with a relatively
high cost of disenfranchisement.
We empirically test the implications of the model over the 1870-1930 period. We proxy the
gender wage gap with the level of per capita incomea n dt h ec o s to fd i s e n f r a n c h i s e m e n tw i t ht h e
presence of Catholicism, which is associated with a more traditional view of women’s role and thus
a lower cost. The gender gap in the preferences for public goods is proxied by the availability
of divorce, which implies marital instability and a more vulnerable economic position for women.
Consistently with the model’s predictions, women suﬀrage is aﬀected positively by per capita income
and negatively by the presence of Catholicism and the availability of divorce, while women suﬀrage
increases the size of government only in non-Catholic countries.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: P16, J16, N40, H50, 011.
Key Words: women suﬀrage, inequality, public goods, welfare state, culture, family, divorce.
1“...the exclusion of women (...) from any share in the representation (...) violates
one of the oldest of our constitutional maxims (...) that taxation and representation
should be co-extensive.”
John Stuart Mill, House of Commons, 20 May 1867
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Despite the fact that women represent at least half of the world population, in the large and growing
literature on suﬀrage extension and its economic causes and eﬀects little attention has been devoted
to the analysis of women’s enfranchisement. Historically, in the vast majority of cases, women were
t h el a s tt ob eg r a n t e dt h er i g h tt ov o t e ,t h u sc o m ing after poor men. This consideration casts
doubts on the relevance, when applied to women suﬀrage, of the often purely economic arguments
developed in the literature on franchise extension.
In this paper, we derive and test a political economy model which oﬀers a rationale for the
decision to extend the franchise to women. The basic idea behind our theory is that the franchise
is always extended by a group with power to a group without power when an event, or a sequence
of events, interferes with its decision making process. Our goal is to understand which factors are
involved when the ﬁrst group is represented by men, and the second by women.
While the focus of the paper is on that unique transitional period that runs from the last few
decades of the nineteenth century until the 1930s, when the franchise is extended to women in those
countries that are now modern industrial democracies, the implications of our results can also be
usefully applied to a comparative analysis of women’s rights across countries with diﬀerent levels of
development. The World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report (2007) shows that women’
political empowerment is far from complete even in the most advanced countries, with top-scoring
Sweden at 52.5%, and that there is still considerable cross-country variation, with Yemen at the
lowest rank with a score of 0.8%.
The main assumptions on which our model rests are the following.
First, men are richer than women, since men and women are endowed with equal amounts
of mental labor, while men have a larger endowment of physical labor than women. Since the
development process aﬀects the relative reward of mental and physical labor, the resulting wage
gap evolves over time reﬂecting well-known stylized facts.
2Our second assumption is that women display a higher preference for public goods, which may
reﬂect diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion and diﬀerent perceptions of the role of government as a
potential insurer. Gender diﬀerences in the taste for public goods have been documented in several
contexts. Family structure can be an explanations for this pattern, so that institutions aﬀecting
the stability of family structure, such as divorce, can be related to women’s preferences.
Our third assumption is that there is a cost for society associated with women’s disenfranchise-
ment. This cost is determined by a country’s culture, and in particular its family culture, i.e., the
perceptions of women’s role within the family and in society at large, including women’s economic,
social, and political roles. Religion is a primary explanation of the observed cross-country diﬀer-
ences in such attitudes, with Catholicism being associated with a more traditional women’s role
and thus a lower cost of disenfranchisement.
We introduce the above three assumptions within a dynamic politico-economic model populated
by overlapping generations of constant size and with stationary endowments. The technology
combines capital with the two kinds of labor endowments, physical and mental labor, in such a
way that the richer in capital is an economy, the more highly rewarded is mental labor relative to
physical. Finally, there is a government that levies a proportional income tax in order to ﬁnance a
public good.
In the resulting framework, we compare the preferred tax rate of the median voter under full
male suﬀrage - and full female disenfranchisement - with the preferred tax rate under universal
suﬀrage. We show that, as the economy industrializes and the reward to mental labor increases
relative to physical labor, the relative wage of women increases, until the time when, for the
male median voter, the cost of women’s disenfranchisement is higher than the cost of accepting
the median voter’s choice under universal suﬀrage. The male median voter is therefore better oﬀ
extending the franchise to women, since economic development and the consequent reduction of the
gender wage gap make the women’s preferred tax rate closer to that of the men’s, thus increasing the
relative cost of disenfranchisement, until it makes no sense for the men to keep women from voting.
We also explore the implications for the size of government, and show that its expansion following
women’s enfranchisement is to be expected only in societies where the cost of disenfranchisement
is high relative to the gender-related gaps in wages and public good preferences, i.e., in countries
with a progressive culture.
The second part of the paper tests the implications of the model for a sample of 22 countries over
the 1870-1930 period. The model’s main predictions are that the decision to enfranchise women is
3aﬀected negatively by the gender gaps in wages and in the preferences for public goods, positively
by the cost of disenfranchisement. We proxy the gender wage gap inversely with the level of income
per capita. We capture the cost of disenfranchisement with a measure of society’s culture given
by religion, where the presence of Catholicism is associated with a more conservative perception
of the gender role and thus with a smaller cost. The proxy we employ for the gender gap in the
preferences for public goods is the availability of divorce, which implies marital instability and a
more vulnerable social and economic position for women, and therefore a higher female preference
for government and redistribution. We show that, consistently with the model’s predictions, women
suﬀrage is aﬀected positively by the level of per capita income and negatively by the presence of
Catholicism and the availability of divorce, even after controlling for the general level of democracy.
Moreover, we show that the size of government tends to be positively aﬀected by women suﬀrage, as
uncovered by previous studies, but also that the negative impact of the interaction between women
suﬀrage and the proportion of Catholics indicates that the impact of women suﬀrage is lowest in
conservative, Catholic societies where disenfranchisement costs are small, since under small costs
the franchise is extended only when the gender gaps are small, implying a small increase in the
resulting tax rate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the related literature. Section 3 reviews
the historical evidence on the enfranchisement of women and the evolution of divorce legislation
in the relevant time period. Section 4 presents the basic model. Section 5 contains the analysis
of the model. Section 6 explores extensions of the basic model. Section 7 empirically tests the
implications of the model. Section 8 summarizes our ﬁndings and indicates directions for related
future research.
2 Related literature
While the issue of franchise extension has recently received considerable attention within the liter-
ature on institutions, with contributions by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Bertocchi and Spagat
(2001), Justman and Gradstein (1999), Lizzeri and Persico (2004), and Llavador and Oxoby (2005),
few papers have so far speciﬁcally focused on the determinants of the extension of the franchise to
women. While our goal is to provide a theoretical and empirical investigation of the determinants
of female empowerment - as captured by the voting franchise - at the societal level, Doepke and
Tertilt (2007) model the impact of education and human capital on the relative bargaining posi-
4tion of men and women within the family, and Geddes and Lueck (2002) empirically evaluate the
determinants of women’s property rights in the US in the 1850-1920 period.
Several papers, on the other hand, investigate the related question of the impact of women’s
enfranchisement on the size and composition of government. Lindert (1994) presents a broader
empirical investigation on the determinants of the rise in social spending the 1880-1930 period. His
sample therefore includes the unique transitional period between the males-only franchise and the
extension of the franchise to women, for which he ﬁnds a positive impact on the size of government.
Lott and Kenny (1999) investigate the same issue for the United States in the 1870-1940 period
and again ﬁnd a positive eﬀect. They also ﬁnd evidence that the gender gap at least in part arises
from women’s fear that they can be left to raise children on their own, and conclude that family
breakdown and increasing divorce rates may be a channel through which women’s preferences may
aﬀect government size. Aidt et al. (2006) focus on the impact of democracy on government spending
in 1830-1938 Europe and conﬁrm that female suﬀrage has a positive impact, through spending on
collective goods such health, education and welfare. They also stress the diﬀerential impact of
franchise extension to men and women, where the former had contributed to the general growth
in government mainly through an expansion of spending on security and long-term public services.
Aidt and Dallal (2008) present further evidence on a positive and sizeable long-run impact of women
suﬀrage on spending for six Western European countries for the period 1869-1960. The post-war
experience is often focused on the case of Switzerland, which granted women voting rights only in
1971, thus providing ground for a unique natural experiment. Abrams and Settle (1999) show that
women suﬀrage raised the overall size of the Swiss government, and that this occurred through
welfare spending, but not government consumption. At the cantonal level, Funk and Gathmann
(2005) ﬁnd larger gender diﬀerences regarding the scope, rather than the size, of government,
with a negative overall impact and diﬀerential eﬀects across diﬀerent kinds of expenditures. For
instance, women oppose some types of expenditures such as welfare, education, security, while
support environment and culture. Also at the cantonal level, Krogstrup and Walti (2006) ﬁnd that
including women in the electorate increases average per capita budget balances.1
The above literature on women suﬀrage and government size is closely related to a parallel line
of research which has studied the discrepancy between men’s and women’s political preferences.
1The relevance of gender for ﬁscal policy is also explored by Alesina and Ichino (2007), who review the theory of
optimal taxation in light of the fact that labor supply elasticity is higher for women than for men, and show that
income tax rates should be lower for women than for men.
5The common denominator between these two branches of the literature is the idea is that women
care more about social issues and that they tend to be poorer than men. The reasons for these
diﬀerences can be found in societal modernization, which brings marital instability and an evolu-
tion of traditional sex roles. In particular, the diﬀusion of divorce and the evolution of the relevant
legislation are viewed as possible reasons why, at least in the past few decades, women prefer higher
public expenditures than men, and therefore vote for those parties, typically of the Left, that fa-
vor heavier public intervention. The argument can be related to that in Lott and Kenny (1999),
previously mentioned with regard to the impact of women’s choice on the size of government in
1870-1940 US case. In particular, Edlund and Pande (2001) study the evolution of the political
gender gap during the last three decades in the United States, where women have increasingly
favored the Democratic party, and trace these developments to the decline in marriage. In par-
ticular, they show a strong positive correlation between state divorce prevalence and the political
gender gap, with higher divorce prevalence reducing support for the Democrats among men but
not women.2 Washington (2006) tests the hypothesis that parenting daughters increases support
for women’s issues and shows that the propensity to vote liberally on reproductive rights is signif-
icantly increasing in a US Congress member’s proportion of daughters. Oswald and Powdthavee
(2006) model the idea that daughters make people more left-wing and provide supporting evidence
for Britain. How the composition of public spending can be aﬀected by gender-based diﬀerences
in tastes for public goods is the question addressed by Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo (2004), who ﬁnd
that women’s political inﬂuence in village councils in India matters substantially for the types of
public goods provided.3
Since culture, as captured by religion, plays a crucial role in our theoretical and empirical
analysis, we also contribute to recent research on the economic impact of culture - including papers
by Fernandez and Fogli (2007), Giuliano (2007), Guiso et al. (2006), and Tabellini (2005) - and
particularly religion, since religion seems to be a particularly important cultural trait as far as
family attitudes and the perception of women’s role are concerned. Contributions include Bisin
and Verdier (2000), Guiso et al. (2003), Botticini and Eckstein (2005), and Algan and Cahuc (2006).
2Friedberg (1998) also explores the impact of unilateral divorce laws on divorce rates, while Stevenson and Wolfers
(2007) study the inﬂuence of divorce reforms on family formation decisions.
3Cavalcanti and Tavares (2006) explore another complementary reason why women may prefer larger government,
by assuming that government spending decreases the cost of performing household chores. Experimental evidence
from standard public goods games, collected by Cipriani et al. (2007), also suggests that boys are less cooperative
than girls.
6In particular, Guiso et al. (2003) use the World Value Survey to identify the relationship between
intensity of religious beliefs and attitudes toward women and ﬁnd that religious people tend to be
less favorable with respect to working women. However, they do not focus on the relative impact
of diﬀerent religious denominations. Algan and Cahuc (2006) provide international micro-evidence
to show that the male breadwinner values are highly positively correlated with the fact to be a
Catholic or a Muslim.
Finally, this paper also connects to the literature which has studied the economic position of
women, linking it to the stages of the development process. The existence of a discrepancy between
men’s and women’s earnings has been well-documented at least since biblical times. Their gradual
convergence since the second part of the nineteenth century, however, has also been substantial.
Goldin (1990) shows that full-time earnings of American women rose from 46 to 67 percent of men’s
earnings over the 1890-1988 period, and links these ﬁndings to the impact of industrialization and
the increased importance of non-manual skills. Galor and Weil (1996) study the determinants
of women’s relative wage in a model where industrialization promotes the role of mental labor
relative to an agrarian economy where physical labor is more rewarded. The gender wage gap can
therefore be directly related to the agricultural share of labor, and tends to decrease as the role
of agriculture declines. Owen and You (2005) ﬁnd that the process of development has a positive
impact on attitudes towards women and on the quality and quantity of women’s human capital.
The transition from agriculture to manufacturing inﬂuences not only the gender wage gap, but more
generally the workings of the family, including parenting decisions and intergenerational links, as
established by Galor and Moav (2002) and Bertocchi (2006), respectively.
3H i s t o r i c a l e v i d e n c e
In the ﬁrst subsection below we present the main historical facts related to the extension of the
franchise to women. Among the determinants of women suﬀrage that our model and the subsequent
empirical analysis highlight, a prominent role is played by economic considerations captured by the
gender wage gap. For the relevant stylized facts of its evolution we refer to Goldin (1990).4 The
historical role of the Roman Catholic church in shaping family culture, which also plays a crucial role
in our context, is relatively well-known (see Algan and Cahuc, 2006, for an exhaustive discussion),
while less is known in the economic literature about the history of divorce, which we link to women’s
4The decision to enfranchise women is also generally preceded by a gradual rise of women’s labor force participation
(see Costa, 2000), which reinforces the impact of the reduction of the gender wage gap.
7preferences for public goods. Therefore, in the second subsection, we supply speciﬁc evidence on
the evolution of divorce legislation during the relevant time period.
Table 1 summarizes information on the timing of the introduction of women suﬀrage and divorce
in the 22 countries of our sample. The discussion below is, however, more general, and thus touches
on a larger set of countries.
3.1 The enfranchisement of women
In this section we brieﬂy discuss the historical evidence related to the extension of the franchise to
women. The period that goes from the end of the nineteenth century until the 1920s witnessed a
ﬁrst wave of extensions of the franchise to women, despite marked cross-country diﬀerentiation even
within Europe. Opposition to women’s enfranchisement came from a view of women as subordinate
to men and unable to form independent political judgement, and from the idea - strongly supported
b yt h ec l e r g y ,a n di np a r t i c u l a rb yt h eR o m a nC a t h o l i cc h u r c h-t h a tt h eo n l yp l a c ef o raw o m a n
was to be the home. Even Left-wing parties were often against women enfranchisement, out of fear
that women might make conservative political choices.
In 1893 New Zealand became the ﬁrst country to grant women the right to vote in national
elections. Australia followed in 1902. In the United States an organized movement on behalf of
woman suﬀrage ﬁrst emerged in 1848. By 1910 women had the right to vote in Wyoming, Utah,
Idaho, Colorado, and Washington, but it is only following the active participation of women to
World War I that in 1919 Congress passed by a narrow margin a woman suﬀrage constitutional
amendment which was ratiﬁed by the states in 1920. Canada adopted national legislation on this
issue in 1917.
Within Europe, the ﬁrst country to extend the franchise to women in national elections was
Finland in 1907. The rest of Scandinavia quickly followed suit, with Norway and Denmark also
allowing women to vote before World War I, while Sweden waited until 1919. British women’s
struggle to achieve the right to vote has a long history culminating with the “suﬀragettes” move-
ment, which intensiﬁed its action around 1905. Nevertheless, as for the United States, it is only
after World War I that women succeeded in achieving the vote, which in 1918 was granted to women
over age 30. In 1928 the franchise ﬁnally became universal. Germany’s Weimar Republic included
women in the electorate in 1918. In the same year Austria and most Eastern European countries
did so, while Belgium the Netherlands joined in 1919. Turning the attention to Southern Europe,
Spain and Portugal enfranchised women in the 1930s, while a subsequent wave of legislation had
8to wait until after World War II, when France, Italy and Greece granted women the franchise in
1944, 1945 and 1952, respectively. A unique exception in Europe is represented by Switzerland,
where women were granted the vote only in 1971.
Outside Europe, among the late-comers we ﬁnd Japan, China and India, that granted women
the franchise between 1945 and 1950. In Latin America there was a ﬁrst wave of legislation in
the 1930s (involving Ecuador, Chile, Brazil), while Argentina and Mexico only joined after World
War II. Similarly, South Africa granted the franchise to white women in 1930, while most other
African countries enfranchised women after the war and ratiﬁed the universal franchise in the
post-decolonization constitutions. Currently, most countries in the world grant women the voting
franchise, with a few exceptions, notably the countries of the Persian Gulf. However, Kuwait
recently introduced the women’s franchise in 2005.
To be noticed is that women suﬀrage only represents a ﬁrst step in the achievement of equal
political rights, and generally comes before women are allowed to run for oﬃce. To be also noticed
is that in several cases men suﬀrage became universal before women suﬀrage, and that there are
very few examples of women being enfranchised before men of the same social class or race. Fleck
(1993) provides a synopsis for the developments just described. Further details are available for
example in DuBois (1998) and Flexner and Fitzpatrick (1996).
3.2 The introduction of divorce legislation
The standard reference for the history of divorce is Phillips (1988). He provides a broad analysis of
the way divorce laws were transformed during the nineteenth century and the decades immediately
following it.
In Europe, before the nineteenth century a sizeable number of countries with a Protestant
population (the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Switzerland) had provisions
allowing divorce which dated back at least to the Reformation, while divorce was generally unavail-
able in Catholic countries. Religious authorities in Orthodox countries such as Greece and Russia
allowed divorce, although they discouraged it. In 1783 divorce was extended to the non-Catholic
populations of Austria and the Austrian territories, but Austria had to wait until the Nazi divorce
law of 1938 for an extension of the legislation to Austrian Catholics. After the Napoleonic con-
quests, divorce - which had been adopted in France in 1792 with the Revolution, through a very
liberal legislation - was introduced in the countries of the French Empire. With the Restoration,
however, France abolished divorce in 1816, only to reintroduce it in 1884. In 1830 Belgium became
9independent but, despite the fact that it previously allowed divorce only to the non-Catholic popu-
lation, it legalized divorce for all citizens using the Napoleonic Code as a model. In 1857 England’s
ﬁrst divorce law was passed, after nearly three centuries of pressure. Previously, divorce in England
had only been possible through an Act of Parliament. In Italy opposition by the Roman Catholic
church was strong, so that Italy did not recognized divorce in its 1865 new civil code after uniﬁca-
tion. In 1875 Germany extended divorce laws beyond the Protestant states of northern Germany to
Catholic states of the South. In Portugal and Spain divorce was introduced relatively early (1910
and 1932, respectively), only to be revoked in 1940 and 1939, and ﬁnally reintroduced in 1977 and
1981.
Moving outside Europe, the 1857 British divorce law had global implications since the British
legislation became the model throughout the British Empire. Australia and New Zealand soon
adopted similar provisions. However, divorce was not recognized in Canada at the federal level
until 1968, while before that time the only way to get divorced was to apply to the Canadian
Senate. In the United States divorce legislation fell within the jurisdiction of the states. Many of
the states of the North-East introduced divorce legislation soon after independence, in the 1780s
and 1790s. In the South the developments were slower, but by 1860 all states except South Carolina
had passed divorce laws. The Western states rapidly installed liberal divorce laws during the ﬁrst
decades of the nineteenth century. Japan had divorce provisions at least since 1868. In Argentina
and Brazil divorce laws were passed in 1954 and 1975, respectively.
Post-war developments in Europe, beside the afore-mentioned cases of Spain and Portugal,
include the cases of Italy and Ireland. Italy’s introduction of divorce legislation in 1970 was followed
by a ﬁerce but unsuccessful struggle, supported by the Roman Catholic church, to abolish it. In
the Republic of Ireland divorce was prohibited by the 1937 Constitution. In 1986, the electorate
rejected the possibility of allowing divorce in a referendum but, after a second referendum in 1995
the prohibition of divorce was repealed and, despite church opposition, divorce was ﬁnally approved
in 1996.
Moral and religious issues were raised during the decades preceding World War I within the
discussion that surrounded the legislative activity. A long-debated question was whether divorce
was harmful or beneﬁcial to women. Proponents of divorce argued that women could only beneﬁt
from a legislation that protected them from oppressive marriages, while opponents feared that
divorce would make women more vulnerable, both economically and socially. Even the women’s
rights movement was divided on the matter of divorce liberalization, and some feminists perceived
10divorce as a threat for women, rather than a way to liberate themselves.
Overall, by the outbreak of World War I divorce had spread geographically even in predomi-
nantly Catholic countries. At the same time, divorce had also become cheaper, faster and more
easily accessible, by becoming available from regular courts (judicial divorce), rather than from
legislatures (legislative divorce). Moreover, there was a general liberalization with an expansion of
the grounds for divorce. The net eﬀect of these changes, combined with more general social and
economic developments, was a rapid increase in the number of divorces. The divorce rate (per
1,000 population) increased in the United States from 0.2 in 1860 to 0.9 in 1910. In the same year,
the highest ﬁgures elsewhere were represented by Switzerland (0.41) and France (0.36), while most
other countries, including Australia and New Zealand, had rates below 0.2.
4T h e b a s i c m o d e l
4.1 Endowments
We consider an overlapping generations model where N individuals live for two periods. There
is no population growth. In the ﬁrst period of their life, individuals work and receive a wage
income, which is entirely devoted to ﬁnancing second-period consumption and is therefore saved
and invested in the capital market. In their second period, acting as capital owners, individuals
receive the return to their savings and consume it entirely, after paying a proportional tax which
is used by the government to ﬁnance a public good.
Individuals come in two kinds: men and women. Each group has equal size. Men and women
diﬀer in two dimensions. First, they diﬀer in their endowments, since they are endowed with
diﬀerent proportions of two kinds of labor input. Following Galor and Weil (1996), we assume
that men and women have equal endowments of mental input, but that men have more physical
strength than women. To simplify, we simply assume that women have no physical strength.
Beside gender heterogeneity, there is also individual heterogeneity. In particular, each man
receives an identical number of units of physical labor, which we normalize at 1, such that  pi =1 ,
while endowments of mental labor  pi are diﬀerentiated across individuals, for i =1 ,2,...,N.
Moreover, the distribution of mental labor is assumed to be skewed to the right, i.e., the median
mental labor endowment is smaller than the mean  m. The distribution of mental labor is the same
for men and women. It follows that the total supply of physical labor at each t is Lp = N
2 ,while
the total supply of mental labor is Lm = N m.
11Men and women also diﬀer in their preferences, as discussed below.
4.2 Technology
There are three factors of production: physical capital, K, physical labor, Lp,a n dm e n t a ll a b o r
Lm. Physical labor is the kind of labor in which men have superior abilities to women, i.e., work
requiring strength. Mental labor is labor in which men and women have equal abilities. Again
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where Yt is aggregate output, a,b > 0, 0 <α<1, and −∞ <σ<1. This functional form assumes
that physical capital and mental labor exhibit complementarity in production, whereas physical
labor is neither a complement nor a substitute for either. This formulation implies that, the richer
in physical capital is an economy, the more highly rewarded is mental labor relative to physical
labor.
All factors of production are assumed to earn their marginal products as determined by proﬁt
maximization under perfect competition. Given the structure of the production technology, the
return to a unit of physical labor at time t, ω
p
t, and the return to mental labor at time t, ωm
t ,a r e
ω
p
t = b (2)
ωm
t = a(1 − α)(Lm)ρ−1[αK
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t  pi, while women earn a wage wiF
t = ωm
t  pi.I n c r e a s e si nt h e
amount of physical capital, holding mental labor constant, raise the return to mental labor thus




Men and women also diﬀer in their preferences, since women display a more pronounced preference
for the public good gt which the government provides at each t.T h i sd i ﬀerence can be explained by
the diﬀerent role of men and women in society and within the family, with women ﬁnding themselves






t + γjgt (4)
where c
ij
t is private consumption at time t for an individual born at time t−1, for i =1 ,2,...,N and
j = M,F, and γj,f o rj = M,F, is a parameter which captures gender diﬀerences in the preferences
for the public good, such that γF >γ M = 1, where the male value of the parameter is normalized
to 1 for convenience. The gender-related gap in preferences is therefore deﬁned as γF − 1.
The individual budget constraint at time t for an individual born at t − 1i sg i v e nb y
c
ij









t−1rt, for j = M,F,rt is the return to capital, and τt
is a proportional tax rate imposed on individual income.
4.4 Government
Tax revenues are used by the government to ﬁnance the public good according to the following
balanced budget constraint:





where yt is mean income at t and the second term captures tax collection costs.
The tax rate is set through a political choice under majority voting, as in Meltzer and Richard
(1981). Each enfranchised individual casts a vote at each period on the contemporaneous level of
the tax, τt, such that 0 <τ t < 1. The level of the tax chosen by the median voter varies with the
evolution of wage inequality and with the degree of enfranchisement.
We can derive the indirect utility function as
v
ij
t =( 1− τt)y
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13To be noticed is that under our assumptions on preferences, even though we allow for two
dimensions of heterogeneity - income and gender - our voting problem remains one-dimensional





Bolton and Roland (1996) label “hedonic income”. Since indirect utility is single-peaked with
respect to the tax rate, we can apply the median voter theorem and establish that, under universal
suﬀrage, the equilibrium tax rate is the preferred tax rate of the median voter, τ∗








t is median income and γ∗ is the median value of the preferences parameter. The latter is
equal to the mean value γ, where γ = 1
2 + 1
2γF, with γM <γ<γ F.
4.5 Dynamic political-economic equilibrium under universal franchise




that at each t utility and proﬁts are maximized, the capital market clears, and the tax rate is
optimally set by the median voter, starting from a given initial value of K0 > 0.
The evolution of capital can be tracked by
Kt = Nwt−1 = f(Kt−1) (10)
where wt−1 is the average wage at t−1 and the function f depends on the technology’s parameters
a,b,α, and ρ.
Along the equilibrium path, as physical capital accumulates, women’s relative wage increases,
thus reducing gender inequality.
Moreover, the redistribution scheme embedded in the way the public good is ﬁnanced induces
convergence of individual incomes. In the long run, the dynamical system evolves towards a steady
state which is associated with constant values of cij,K,Y,and τ∗.
5 The enfranchisement of women
To understand the reasons why the franchise was extended to women at some historical point, we
now assume that the voting problem we described in the previous section is constrained by the
assumption that men alone are allowed to vote, while all women are disenfranchised. Moreover,
we assume that society bears a cost for women’s disenfranchisement. This cost can be related to a
14country’s culture, and in particular its family culture, i.e., the perceptions of women’s role within
the family and in society at large, including their economic, social, and political roles. When the




t ≤ (1 − τt)y
ij
t − δ (11)
To be noticed that the cost δ could alternatively enter directly in the utility function, without
aﬀecting subsequent results. While we model δ as a ﬁxed cost, our results below hold as long as the
cost is increasing over time, or even if it is decreasing but not too fast relative to the other variables
we consider. In particular, by endogeneizing the cost of disenfranchisement as a decreasing function
of, once again, the gender wage gap, we would obtain a cost which is increasing over time, with
a consequent acceleration of women’s enfranchisement (see Section 6.1). An increasing cost would
be consistent with the historical evidence regarding the gradual strengthening of the movement for
women’s suﬀrage. The expression for the indirect utility function of a male individual is now given
by
viM
t =( 1− τt)yiM













t is the income level of the male median voter. Since we assumed that γM =1 , it
follows that ˆ yiM
t = yiM
t , i.e., for a man, there is no distinction between income and hedonic income.
Clearly, τ∗M
t is smaller than τ∗
t , the rate set under universal franchise and derived in (9), since the
median hedonic income level is now higher, both because of the smaller male preferences parameter
and because of the higher median male income. As a consequence, the indirect utility of the male
median voter would be reduced if the higher tax rate τ∗
t , applying in the case of universal franchise,
were applied. On the other hand, women’s disenfranchisement bears a cost which must be weighted
against these considerations. It follows that the male median voter is better oﬀ keeping women out
of the electoral process if and only if
(1 − τ∗M
t )y∗M













5Consistently with most historical evidence, we assume that the issue of women enfranchisement is posed only
after universal franchise is reached for men.
15Over time, as the economy industrializes and the reward to mental labor increases relative to
physical labor, the relative wage of women increases, thus reducing the gender wage gap and
inducing a reduction in the implied τ∗
t . At some t, for the male median voter, the cost of women’s
disenfranchisement becomes higher than the cost of accepting the higher tax rate which would be
chosen by the median voter under universal enfranchisement. It follows that condition (14) is no
longer satisﬁed, so that the male median voter is better oﬀ extending the franchise to women.
In practice, the driving force of enfranchisement is the fact that economic development and the
consequent reduction of the gender wage gap make the women’s preferred tax rate closer to that
of the men’s. Since the men face a cost of disenfranchisement, as the threat of a women-imposed
higher tax fades out, it makes less and less sense for the men to keep women from voting.
In more detail, three factors are involved in the determination of the timing of this decision.
First, the larger is the cost of disenfranchisement, and more progressive is society’s view of women’s
role, the sooner the franchise is extended to women. Second, the smaller is the men-women discrep-
ancy in the preferences for the public good, the sooner the enfranchisement. Finally, the franchise
is extended sooner in societies where physical labor is less rewarded relative to mental labor, i.e.,
where capital accumulation and industrialization have reached a more advanced stage. Thus, even
assuming, as we do so far, that preferences and cultural factors are time invariant, the model
establishes a relationship between the level of economic development and women’s political status.
Our main results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (i) A male median voter extends the franchise to women when (14) is no longer
satisﬁed, i.e., when the cost of a suboptimal tax rate outweights the cost of disenfranchisement.
(ii) The franchise is extended to women sooner, the lower is the gender wage gap, wM
t − wF
t ;
the lower is the gender gap in the preferences for public goods, γF −1; and the larger is the cost of
disenfranchisement, δ.
To conclude, it should be noticed that, while the model assumes universal male suﬀrage, the
presence of a franchise requirement based on income would further delay the enfranchisement of
women since they are poorer than men. Therefore, we should expect the general level of democracy
to facilitate the decision to enfranchise women.
The results we have reached so far also shed light on the implication of women’s franchise for
the size of government. Its expansion following women enfranchisement is to be expected only in
societies where the cost of disenfranchisement is high relative to women’s relative wage and public
16good preferences, i.e., those factors that imply a large diﬀerential between the political choice of
men vs. women. Namely, in culturally conservative societies where such cost is low, it is legitimate
to expect that enfranchisement occurs only when the wage gap is signiﬁcantly reduced and/or when
the preferences gap is moderate. This implies in turn a limited impact of enfranchisement on the size
of government. On the other hand, in progressive societies where the cost is large, suﬀrage extension
might be associated with a signiﬁcant shift in the median voter’s choice and a subsequent large
impact on the size of government. Our results can explain the seemingly contradictory historical
and comparative evidence regarding the impact of women suﬀrage on the size of government. This
result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 For countries with similar levels of the gender-related wage and preferences gaps,
the impact of the enfranchisement of women on the size of government increases with the cost of
disenfranchisement.
6 Extensions of the basic model
6.1 Endogenous preferences for the public good
The results we have so far derived depend crucially on a parameter, the preference for public
goods, that we have assumed to be exogenous and time invariant. However, it may be hard
to disentangle the impact on a woman’s choice of her relative wage from that of her preference
parameter. To address this concern, we extend the basic formulation to allow for an endogenous
process of preference formation linking a higher preference for the public good to a lower income























, grows over time with the
reduction of the wage gap, although it never converges to 1 since physical labor is only endowed to
men. It follows that the level of the tax that applies under universal suﬀrage declines over time and
gets closer to the tax that is set under exclusive male suﬀrage. Therefore, this process accelerates
the enfranchisement of women since it magniﬁes the impact of the development process on relative
wages.
Our results in the basic model also rely on a second exogenous parameter, the cost of women’s
disenfranchisement. However, since our interpretation of such cost is based on a country’s culture,
17it is safer in this case to accept its exogeneity. On the other hand, even if culture, and in particular
family culture, are strongly associated with slow-varying traits, such as religious aﬃliation, it cannot
be denied that some adaptation does take place. By endogeneizing the cost of disenfranchisement
as a decreasing function of, once again, the gender wage gap, we would obtain a cost which is
increasing over time, with a consequent acceleration of women’s enfranchisement. An increasing
cost would be consistent with the historical evidence regarding the gradual strengthening of the
movement for women’s suﬀrage.
6.2 Couples as decision makers
While in the previous analysis we have modeled men and women as independent decision makers,
an established tradition within the literature that distinguishes the roles of men and women has
focused on their interaction within the family (see Chiappori, 1988). Doepke and Tertilt (2007)
also address the issue of women’s rights from an intra-family perspective. In this subsection, we
develop an extension of our basic model where men and women interact within a bargaining model
of the family. The goal is to show that the main conclusions from the basic model carry over to
the present variant.
Assume that all men are matched with all women in a perfectly assortative fashion according to
their labor endowments, so that the best-endowed man mates the best-endowed woman, and so on.




t +( 1− β)uhM
t (16)
for h =1 ,2,..., 1
N, where as in (4) utility depends on private consumption and a public good, and
the latter is valued by women more than by men. The parameter β captures the relative bargaining
position of men and women, i.e., the level of women’s rights in society. Assume that β is set by men,









t is the couple’s income. It is suﬃcient to impose non-linearity of the utility
function in the level of consumption in order to derive an optimal sharing rule for the couples’









where γC = β +( 1− β)γF. The tax rate is decreasing in β: the lower is the bargaining power of
women within the family, the lower is public good provision. Thus, as long as women are treated
as inferior, the associated tax rate is smaller than in an equal rights society. Men will grant equal
rights to women, by setting β = 1
2, only if the cost of accepting a higher tax rate, and a smaller
share of the private consumption good, is lower than the cost, δ, carried by women’s alienation. To
be noticed it that, in this variant of the basic model, the share of the private consumption good also
plays a role, while the gender wage gap does not. The latter feature in turn implies that men base
their choice of β solely on γF and δ, i.e., independently of the stage of the process of development.
Only a shock to these parameters could justify a shift in the gender balance of power.
7E m p i r i c a l ﬁndings
7.1 Data
We base our empirical investigation on the predictions of the model on a data set covering 22
countries over the 1870-1930 period. For most variables, we construct a ﬁve-year panel data set,
taking the observation at the beginning of each ﬁve-year period.6
To test Proposition 1, we select the dependent variable by coding information on women suﬀrage
to construct a dummy for countries that have at least partial women suﬀrage at the beginning of
each ﬁve-year period.
The model predicts three main candidates as determinants of the enfranchisement of women:
the gender wage gap, the gender gap in public good preferences, and the cost of disenfranchisement.
While data on the gender wage gap are not available for our sample, we show in our model
that the gender wage gap is inversely related to the general level of development. This relationship
is also documented empirically by Goldin (1990). We therefore proxy for the gender wage gap
with the per capita level of GDP in constant dollars (in logarithms). As an alternative measure of
development, we also collect data on the agricultural share of labor.
For the gender-based discrepancy in the preferences for the public good we use as a proxy the
presence of divorce legislation. We code this variable at the beginning of each ﬁve-year period. The
idea is that the availability of divorce induces marital insecurity and therefore a higher preference for
6We prefer this procedure to averaging the ﬁve-yearly data, since averaging introduces additional serial correlation.
19public goods for women in the face of an uncertain future. This interpretation has been suggested
by Lott and Kenny (1999), who link diﬀerential preferences toward the size of government in the
United States before 1940 to marital instability, and by Edlund and Pande (2001), who trace the
post-war evolution of diﬀerential political preferences in the same country to family breakdown.
As shown by Algan and Cahuc (2006), the conception of the gender role in society is strongly
inﬂuenced by religion, with Catholics and Muslims being more prone to support a traditional view
if compared to Protestants, Jews and non religious people. It is reasonable to assume that the cost
of disenfranchisement is smaller in societies where culture, and in particular family culture, favors
a traditional role for women. For our sample, the most important distinction appears to be the
one between the Catholic and the other religions, so our proxy for the cost of disenfranchisement
is the share of Catholics over population, with a higher share being associated with a lower cost.7
We complete our data set with a variable capturing the overall level of democracy. To this
aim we select a standard measure of democracy represented by the Polity variable from the Polity
IV data set, which includes information on several characteristics of a political system irrespec-
tively, however, of women suﬀrage. Finally, we also select additional variables which may play an
independent role: namely, a measure of education and a dummy reﬂecting legal origins.
To test Proposition 2, we employ as dependent variable a measure of the size of government
over GDP compiled by Lindert (1994) with a focus on social spending. In particular, spending for
infrastructure and defense is not included.8 Total government expenditures are also decomposed
into expenditures for welfare, pensions, health, and housing. All government data are only avail-
able at the beginning of each decade, starting in 1880. Therefore, this second part of the empirical
investigation is based on a ten-year panel data set. Adapting previously cited speciﬁcations con-
ducted over comparable samples, we include among our covariates (the logarithm of) per capita
GDP, the agricultural share, a measure of the age structure of the population capturing the weight
of the young, the level of democracy, and a measure of the presence of Catholics, in addition to the
women suﬀrage dummy which is the focus of our attention.
Detailed information on each variable and its sources is provided in the Data Appendix. Table
2 reports summary statistics for the variables in our data set.
7The variables’ range is on [0,1].
8For several countries in our samples the level of government expenditures is 0, especially in the initial decades. As
described by Lindert (1994), very few governments paid nationwide subsidies for pensions, housing and unemployment
in 1880.
207.2 Results
7.2.1 The determinants of women’s enfranchisement
We apply the intuition coming from theory and we investigate the determinants of women’s enfran-
chisement using an empirical speciﬁcation which treats women suﬀrage as a function of per capita
income, the presence of a divorce legislation, and the presence of Catholicism as the dominant
religion, controlling for the general level democracy. We can now detail our hypotheses regarding
the potential role of the above mentioned factors.
The level of per capita income is meant to proxy for the gender wage gap, with a higher income
being associated with a smaller wage gap and therefore with a smaller discrepancy between the tax
chosen by a male median voter and that chosen by a woman. Therefore, per capita income should
exert a positive impact of the decision to enfranchise women.
The availability of divorce, if it proxies for marital insecurity and a larger discrepancy between
male and female preferences for public goods, should induce a higher tax rate if women were allowed
to vote, and therefore should delay women’s enfranchisement. Divorce should therefore enter with
a negative coeﬃcient.
The more conservative is family culture, as captured by the presence of Catholicism, the less
likely is that women are allowed a political voice. The coeﬃcient of the Catholic share should
therefore be negative.
Finally, the general degree of democracy should favor the extension of the franchise.
Table 3 reports our ﬁve-year regression results over the 1870-1930 period for the presence of
women suﬀrage. In column (1) we present a ﬁrst parsimonious speciﬁcation showing that our
three main determinants all enter with a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient with the expected sign. In column
(2) we add the level of democracy, which is highly signiﬁcant and positive, as expected. In the
following robustness checks, we always refer as a benchmark to the latter extended speciﬁcation.
In column (3) we enter the ﬁve-year lag of all regressors, in order to alleviate the potential problem
of reverse causation between women suﬀrage and its determinants: all results are conﬁrmed despite
the smaller sample. Our results so far are based on OLS linear probability regressions but, in
column (4), we show that results from a binary, probit model are broadly similar to those of the
linear model, despite the fact that Catholicism loses signiﬁcance.9 The panel dimension of the data
set, however, is more easily dealt with in a linear model, so that in column (5) we run an OLS
9A logit speciﬁcation yields results similar to the probit and is not reported for brevity.
21speciﬁcation with ﬁxed country eﬀects. The resulting R2 is improved but our previous conclusions
are conﬁrmed. This suggests that, despite the potential for omitted variable bias, due to the fact
that other factors may determine the relationship between women suﬀrage and the regressors we
focus on, correcting for these factors through ﬁxed eﬀects does not aﬀect our results. Finally, in
column (6) we show that our results are robust also with respect to the inclusion of time eﬀects.
Table 4 adds new covariates, one-by-one, to the pooled OLS regression in Table 3, column
(2). In column (1) we add the agricultural share of labor, which is insigniﬁcant. When entered
as an alternative to income, the agricultural share displays as expected a negative and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient. The high correlation between these two regressors explains the insigniﬁcance of the
latter when jointly entered. The next two covariates both add some explanatory power without
altering the previous conclusions. In particular, the eﬀect of education is signiﬁcantly negative,
which is somewhat surprising, even if this could be justiﬁed by the fact that education in this
historical period tended to be a privilege of men, and thus tended to increase the gender wage gap.
The eﬀects of a common law legal origin is also signiﬁcantly negative, which suggests that, at the
margin, these countries were slower in implementing reforms.10
Overall, we can conclude that our theory of the determinants of women’s enfranchisement, which
highlights the role to the gender wage gap, as represented by the income level, the gender diﬀerence
in public good preferences, as proxied by the way divorce legislation shapes family structure, and
the type of society’s culture, as captured by the relative weight of religious denominations, is indeed
supported by the empirical evidence we provide.
7.2.2 The impact of women’s enfranchisement on government size
An implication of the main proposition in the model predicts that the impact of women suﬀrage
on the size of government should be larger in societies where the cost of disenfranchisement is
high relative to those factors that imply a large diﬀerential between the political choice of men vs.
women, i.e., the gender gaps in wages and public good preferences.
We test this prediction using an empirical speciﬁcation which treats the size of government
as a function of the standard determinants employed in the literature, with and without women
suﬀrage. The other regressors in our speciﬁcation are the level of income per capita (in logarithms),
the agricultural share, the share of young population, the degree of democracy, and the share of
Catholics. For a comparable sample of 21 countries over the same 1880-1930 period, Lindert (1994)
10Analogous (unreported) results are obtained for probit and panel OLS speciﬁcations.
22ﬁnds a positive eﬀect of women suﬀrage on social spending.11 Qualitatively similar results can be
found for Europe in Aidt et al. (2006) and Aidt and Dallal (2008), for samples of 12 countries in
1830-1938 and six countries in 1869-1960, respectively.12
The main innovation we introduce within the above described framework is to gauge the rele-
vance of the interaction between the presence of Catholicism and women suﬀrage, in order to clarify
to which extent a conservative culture retards women suﬀrage at least until a stage at which its
impact on government - through the gender gaps in wages and public good preferences - is mini-
mized. In other words, a negative sign for the interaction would indicate that in Catholic countries
t h ei m p a c to fw o m e ns u ﬀrage on government is reduced, if compared with non-Catholic countries.
In fact, adding this interaction, the coeﬃcient of women suﬀrage would solely capture the impact
on government size for non-Catholic countries. We therefore expect this coeﬃcient to be larger
than in a regression where the interaction is not considered.
Table 5 shows our main results using ten-year, Tobit13 regressions. In column (1) we only
consider standard determinants, without women suﬀrage, and ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant impact
for income per capita and democracy, while the coeﬃcients of young population and Catholic share
are signiﬁcantly negative, and agriculture is negative but not signiﬁcant. The positive inﬂuence
of income appears to support a luxury-good view of government as exempliﬁed by Wagner’s Law.
However, since it is well-known that the relationship between government and income can be
aﬀected by simultaneity problems, we also run the same regression entering the lagged value of
income per capita: the (unreported) results are very similar, even if as expected income loses
signiﬁcance (reduced to the 5% level) to the advantage of democracy. These results are broadly in
line with previous studies.
In column (2) we add women suﬀrage among the regressors and ﬁnd a positive impact for
it, while the impact of the other regressors is conﬁrmed. To address the potential problem of
reverse causation between government size and women suﬀrage, we enter the lagged value of women
suﬀrage, i.e., women suﬀrage at the beginning of the previous decade.14 In column (3) we show
11Among the other regressors Lindert (1994) includes the lagged value of per capita GDP and its growth rate,
the lagged value of the agricultural share, the proportion of young and old individuals, the share of Catholics and
Protestants, a democracy dummy, voter turnout and the frequency of executive turnover.
12Aidt et al. (2006) include per capita GDP, the urbanization rate, a measure of the enfranchisement of men, a
polity dummy, and the share of old population. Aidt and Dallal (2008) also consider gender-related regressors such
as the divorce rate, the share of single women and female labor force participation.
13The dependent variable is often 0 and limited to non-negative values.
14Regressions with the current value of women suﬀrage yield comparable results, even though its level of signiﬁcance
23that adding an interaction between women suﬀrage and the share of Catholics clariﬁes the channels
through which women suﬀrage aﬀects the size of government. As expected, the coeﬃcient of
women suﬀrage is now larger and strongly signiﬁcant at 1%. Moreover, the interaction eﬀect is
also signiﬁcant and with the expected negative sign. In more detail, without the interaction, the
coeﬃcient of women suﬀrage - across all countries independently of their religion - is 0.42. Adding
the interaction, the coeﬃcient of women suﬀrage, which now captures its impact for countries with
no Catholics, becomes 0.71. For countries where Catholics represent 100% of the population, the
impact of women suﬀrage can be computed as the sum of the coeﬃcients of women suﬀrage and
of the interaction, i.e., 0.42 − 0.71, which becomes negative at −0.29. In other words, averaging
over the Catholic population, the impact of women suﬀrage can be computed approximately at a
negligible 0.03.
An analogous set of regressions where divorce is also entered yield nearly identical results, as
the coeﬃcient of divorce is always insigniﬁcant.
Our women suﬀrage dummy refers to the year when legislation was passed. However, we also
codiﬁed an alternative dummy with reference to the time at which women ﬁrst voted. In practice
the two dummies are very highly correlated so that all the above results can be replicated with the
alternative dummy deﬁnition.
It has been argued that women suﬀrage might have an impact non only on the size of govern-
ment, but also on its composition. In Table 6, again for Tobit speciﬁcations, we test this hypothesis
by regressing our variables on each component of government expenditures. Overall, regression re-
sults for individual components are weaker, as it is the case in all previous studies. Nevertheless, we
ﬁnd that indeed the impact of women suﬀrage diﬀers across components. The pattern established
for general expenditures is more closely followed by the pensions, health, and housing components,
despite a lower signiﬁcance level, while welfare expenditures are actually negatively aﬀected by
women suﬀrage, although insigniﬁcantly so. These diﬀormities, however, can at least in part be ex-
plained by the diﬀerential timing of each component’s growth. In particular, welfare expenditures,
which essentially comprise old-style poor relief, were the ﬁrst to be expanded during the initial
decades of the sample, while other forms of intervention were developed later, and therefore appear
to be more closely associated with women suﬀrage reforms, which also came relatively late in the
sample.
The results from Tables 5 and 6 hold qualitatively also under OLS regressions with country
is lower.
24ﬁxed eﬀects.
Overall, our results conﬁrm the relevance of women suﬀrage as a determinant of the size of
government and, more importantly, also clarify that the relative strength of this channel depends
on the factors that determine women suﬀrage. If women suﬀrage is granted because of a large
cost of disenfranchisement, as it is the case in countries with a more progressive culture towards
women, the discrepancy between the tax rates chosen by a male and a female median voters is such
to imply an increase in the size of government, both because women are poorer, and because they
display a higher preference for public goods. On the other hand, in Catholic countries with a small
cost of disenfranchisement we should expect women suﬀrage to be granted only when a male and
a female median voter would make a similar choice regarding tax rates, with a reduced impact on
the size of government.
8C o n c l u s i o n
We have explored the determinants of women’s enfranchisement and found that women are en-
franchised sooner under a lower gender wage gap, a lower gender gap in the preferences for public
goods, and a higher cost of disenfranchisement. Since the gender wage gap is in turn related to
the relative reward of mental vs. physical labor, women’s enfranchisement is accelerated by the
process of capital accumulation and industrialization. Thus the model establishes a relationship
between the level of economic development and women’s political status. The driving force of en-
franchisement is the fact that economic development makes the women’s preferred tax rate closer
to that of the men’s, which in turn increases the relative cost of disenfranchisement. At the same
time, the process is aﬀected by additional factors that reﬂect the structure of the family and the
dominant culture. We have also studied the implications of women’s enfranchisement for the size
of government, and shown that its expansion following women’s enfranchisement is only justiﬁed
in societies where the cost of disenfranchisement is high relative to the gender wage gap and the
gender gap in public good preferences.
We have empirically tested the implications of the model for a sample of 22 countries over the
1870-1930 period. We have proxied the gender wage gap with the level of per capita income. The
proxy we have employed for the gender gap in the preferences for public goods is the availability
of divorce, which implies marital instability and a more vulnerable social and economic position
for women. We have captured the cost of disenfranchisement with a measure of society’s culture
25given by religion, where the presence of Catholicism is associated with a more traditional view of
women’s role, and therefore a smaller cost of disenfranchisement. We have shown that, consistently
with the model’s predictions, women suﬀrage is aﬀected positively by the per capita income level,
negatively by the presence of Catholicism and the availability of divorce, even after controlling for
the general level of democracy. Moreover, our results show that the size of government is positively
aﬀected by women suﬀrage only in societies with a more progressive family culture, as indicated by
t h en e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcient of the interaction between women suﬀrage and the proportion of Catholics.
The main focus of our investigation is the 1870-1930 period, since it includes the unique transi-
tional phase between the males-only franchise and the extension of the franchise to women in those
countries that are now modern industrial democracies. Nevertheless, some of the implications of
our results can also be usefully applied to a comparative analysis of women’s rights across countries
with diﬀerent levels of development. While most countries of the world now practice universal
suﬀrage, the right of women to vote only represents a ﬁrst stage in the process of full political,
economic and social equality.
Further understanding of the causes and consequences of women’s rights is in our agenda for
future research.
26DATA APPENDIX
The sample includes 22 countries over the 1870-1930 period. The countries are Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Data refer to the initial year of each of the 13 ﬁve-year periods, except for
the data on government over GDP, government components over GDP, and the young share, which
are only available at the beginning of each decade starting from 1880. In a few cases data from
adjacent years had to be substituted. The following list describes each variable in the data set and
indicates its sources.
Women suﬀrage: Dummy for countries that have at least partial women suﬀrage. We construct
this variable on the basis of information from Flora (1983), Lindert (1994), and a variety of library
sources.
Log GDP pc: The logarithm of per capita GDP in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. The
source is Maddison (2001).
Divorce: Dummy for countries that allow divorce. We assume that divorce is not allowed if it is
restricted to religious minorities (as for example in Austria) or if it is only achievable through an Act
of Parliament (as for example in Canada). We construct this variable on the basis of information
from Flora (1983) and Phillips (1988).
Catholic share: Catholics over population. Five-year data are adapted from ten-year data in
Lindert (1994).
Democracy: Polity variable. The original range on the interval [−10,10] is normalized on [−1,1].
The source is Polity IV (2002).
Agricultural share: Work force employed in agriculture over work force. The source is Banks
(2001).
Education: Primary and secondary school enrollment over population. The source is Banks
(2001).
Common law: Dummy for countries with a common law legal origin. The source is La Porta et
al. (1999).
Government/GDP: Total government social transfers over GDP. The source is Lindert (1994).
Young share: Population aged 20 to 39 over total population. The source is Lindert (1994).
27Welfare expenditures/GDP: Government expenditures for welfare over GDP. The source is
Lindert (1994).
Pensions expenditures/GDP: Government expenditures for pensions over GDP. The source is
Lindert (1994).
Health expenditures/GDP: Government expenditures for health over GDP. The source is Lin-
dert (1994).
Housing expenditures/GDP: Government expenditures for housing over GDP. The source is
Lindert (1994).
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32Table 1 
The timing of women suffrage and divorce legislation  
Country Women  suffrage  Divorce 
NEW ZEALAND  1893  1867 
AUSTRALIA 1902  Pre-1860 
FINLAND 1906  Pre-1860 
NORWAY 1913  Pre-1860 
DENMARK 1915  Pre-1860 
CANADA 1917  1968 
AUSTRIA 1918  1938 
GERMANY 1918  1875 
IRELAND (1918)  1996 
UK 1918  1857 
BELGIUM 1919  1807 
NETHERLANDS 1919  Pre-1860 
SWEDEN 1919  Pre-1860 
US 1920  Pre-1860 
PORTUGAL 1931  1910-1940,  1977 
SPAIN 1931  1932-39  1981 
BRAZIL 1934  1975 
FRANCE 1944  (1792-1816)  1884 
ITALY 1945  1970 
ARGENTINA 1947  1954 
GREECE 1952  Pre-1860 





Variable Observations Mean Standard  Dev. Minimun Maximum 
Women suffrage  286  0.19  0.39  0  1 
Log GDP pc  266  3.41  0.22  2.83  3.80 
Divorce 286  0.64  0.48  0  1 
Catholic share  260  0.52  0.42  0.00  1.00 
Democracy 247  0.39  0.60  -0.9  1 
Agricultural share  204  0.40  0.16  0.06  0.71 
Education 228  0.13  0.05  0.01  0.23 
Common law  286  0.27  0.44  0  1 
Government/GDP 114  0.60 0.76  0.00 3.4 
Young share  114  0.53  0.05  0.43  0.67 
Welfare exp./GDP  114  0.28  0.36  0.00  1.69 
Pensions exp./GDP  114  0.14  0.28  0.00  1.41 
Health exp./GDP  114  0.18  0.27  0.00  1.28 
Housing exp./GDP  114  0.01  0.05  0.00  0.37 
 Table 3 
The determinants of women’s enfranchisement 





















Log  GDP  pc  0.81 0.47 0.50 3.09 1.34 0.21 
  [0.11]*** [0.14]*** [0.15]***  [1.03]** [0.19]***  [0.12]* 
Divorce  -0.13 -0.20 -0.19 -0.90 -0.39 -0.15 
  [0.07]* [0.07]** [0.08]*  [0.42]* [0.14]** [0.06]* 
Catholic  share  -0.24 -0.25 -0.27 -0.28 -5.38 -0.27 
  [0.08]** [0.08]** [0.08]**  [0.55] [1.71]**  [0.06]*** 
Democracy    0.29 0.28 5.91 0.40 0.20 
    [0.05]*** [0.05]*** [1.65]*** [0.05]*** [0.04]*** 
Adjusted R
2  0.22 0.35 0.34    0.63 0.56 
McFadden R
2      0.54    
Observations  240 212 195 212 212 212 
Five-year panel. Standard errors in brackets. 
# All regressors are lagged five years. * significant 





The determinants of women’s enfranchisement:  
Additional covariates 
Dependent variable: Women suffrage 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
Log GDP pc  1.03  0.93  0.60 
 [0.28]***  [0.18]***  [0.14]*** 
Divorce -0.19  -0.29  -0.28 
 [0.08]*  [0.08]***  [0.07]*** 
Catholic share  -0.28  -0.44  -0.34 
 [0.08]***  [0.09]***  [0.08]*** 
Democracy 0.30  0.33  0.35 
 [0.06]***  [0.05]***  [0.05]*** 
Agricultural share   0.39     
 0.31     
Education   -3.16   
   -0.85***   
Common law      -0.20 
     [0.07]** 
Adjusted R
2 0.39  0.40  0.38 
Observations 166  182  212 
Pooled OLS estimates. Five-year panel. Standard errors in 
brackets. * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** 
significant at 1%.  
 Table 5 
The impact of women’s enfranchisement on government size 
Dependent variable: Government/GDP 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Log GDP pc     2.66  1.87  1.67 
 [0.65]***  [0.67]**  [0.64]** 
Agricultural  share  -0.27 -0.60 -0.91 
  [0.65] [0.62] [0.61] 
Young  share  -12.09 -10.58 -10.40 
  [1.70]*** [1.69]*** [1.61]*** 
Democracy  0.28 0.21 0.18 
 [0.13]*  [0.12]*  [0.12] 
Catholic  share  -1.45 -1.32 -1.17 
  [0.16]*** [0.16]*** [0.17]*** 
Women suffrage    0.42  0.71 
   [0.17]*  [0.21]*** 
Women suffrage.* Cath.share      -0.91 
     [0.42]* 
Adjusted R
2  0.73 0.75 0.77 
Observations  81 81 81 
                 Tobit estimates. Ten-year panel. The variable Women suffrage is lagged ten 
years. Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, 
*** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 6 














  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Log GDP pc     0.10  0.88  0.97  1.30 
  [0.40]  [0.52]*  [0.33]**  [0.57]* 
Agricultural share  -0.85  -0.31  -0.06  -0.55 
  [0.39]*  [0.50]  [0.31]  [0.30]* 
Young share  -5.17  -5.04  -3.58  -2.71 
  [1.02]***  [1.39]***  [0.81]***  [0.95]** 
Democracy  0.00  0.23  0.16  -0.15 
  [0.08]  [0.11]*  [0.07]*  [0.07]* 
Catholic share  -0.75  -0.38  -0.38  -0.01 
  [0.11]***  [0.14]**  [0.09]***  [0.11] 
Women suffrage  -0.01  0.32  0.24  0.10 
  [0.13]  [0.16]*  [0.10]*  [0.10] 
Women.s.*Cath.sh.  0.12  -0.08  -0.74  -0.55 
  [0.27]  [0.31]  [0.24]**  [0.32]* 
Adjusted R
2  0.56 0.54 0.64 0.58 
Observations  81 81 81 81 
Tobit estimates. Ten-year panel. The variable Women suffrage is lagged ten years. 
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant 
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